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Abstract
This paper presents a set of exploits an adversary can
use to continuously spy on most BitTorrent users of the
Internet from a single machine and for a long period of
time. Using these exploits for a period of 103 days, we
collected 148 million IPs downloading 2 billion copies
of contents.
We identify the IP address of the content providers for
70% of the BitTorrent contents we spied on. We show
that a few content providers inject most contents into
BitTorrent and that those content providers are located
in foreign data centers. We also show that an adversary
can compromise the privacy of any peer in BitTorrent
and identify the big downloaders that we define as the
peers who subscribe to a large number of contents. This
infringement on users’ privacy poses a significant im-
pediment to the legal adoption of BitTorrent.
1 Introduction
BitTorrent is one of the most popular peer-to-peer (P2P)
protocols used today for content replication. However,
to this day, the privacy threats of the type explored in
this paper have been largely overlooked. Specifically, we
show that contrary to common wisdom [4,8,11], it is not
impractical to monitor large collections of contents and
peers over a continuous period of time. The ability to do
so has obvious implications for the privacy of BitTorrent
users, and so our goal in this work is to raise awareness
of how easy it is to identify not only content provider
that are peers who are the initial source of the content,
but also big downloaders that are peers who subscribe to
a large number of contents.
To provide empirical results that underscore our as-
sertion that one can routinely collect the IP-to-content
mapping on most BitTorrent users, we report on a study
spanning 103 days that was conducted from a single ma-
chine. During the course of this study, we collected 148
million IP addresses downloading 2 billions copies of
contents. We argue that this is a serious privacy threat
for BitTorrent users. Our key contributions are the fol-
lowing.
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i) We design an exploit that identify the IP address of
the content providers for 70% of the new contents in-
jected in BitTorrent.
ii) We profile content providers and show that a few
of them inject most of the contents in BitTorrent. In par-
ticular, the most active injects more than 6 new contents
every day and are located in hosting centers.
iii) We design an exploit to continuously retrieve with
time the IP-to-content mapping for any peer.
iv) We show that a naive exploitation of the large
amount of data generated by our exploit would lead to
erroneous results. In particular, we design a method-
ology to filter out false positives when looking for
big downloaders that can be due to NATs, HTTP and
SOCKS proxies, Tor exit nodes, monitors, and VPNs.
Whereas piracy is the visible part of the lack of pri-
vacy in BitTorrent, privacy issues are not limited to
piracy. Indeed, BitTorrent is provably a very efficient
[6, 9] and widely used P2P content replication protocol.
Therefore, it is expected to see an increasing adoption
of BitTorrent for legal use. However, a lack of privacy
might be a major impediment to the legal adoption of
BitTorrent. The goal of this paper is to raise attention on
this overlooked issue, and to show how easy it would be
for a knowledgeable adversary to compromise the pri-
vacy of most BitTorrent users of the Internet.
2 Exploiting the Sources of Public Infor-
mation
In this section, we describe the BitTorrent infrastructure
and the sources of public information that we exploit to
identify and profile BitTorrent content providers and the
big downloaders.
2.1 Infrastructure
At a high level, the BitTorrent infrastructure is composed
of three components: the websites, the trackers, and the
peers. The websites distribute the files containing the
meta-data of the contents, i.e., .torrent file. The .torrent
file contains, for instance, the hostname of the server,
called tracker, that should be contacted to obtain a subset
of the peers downloading that content.
The trackers are servers that maintain the content-to-
peers-IP-address mapping for all the contents they are
tracking. Once a peer has downloaded the .torrent file
from a website, it contacts the tracker to subscribe for
that content and the tracker returns a subset of peers that
have previously subscribed for that content. Each peer
typically requests 200 peers from the tracker every 10
minutes. Essentially all the large BitTorrent trackers run
the OpenTracker software so designing an exploit for
this software puts the whole BitTorrent community at
risk.
Finally, the peers distribute the content, exchange
control messages, and maintain the DHT that is a dis-
tributed implementation of the trackers.
2.2 The Content Providers
BitTorrent content providers are the peers who insert
first a content in BitTorrent. They have a central role
because without a content provide no distribution is pos-
sible. We consider that we identify a content provider
when we retrieve its IP address. One approach for iden-
tifying a content provider would be to quickly join a
newly created torrent and to mark the only one peer with
an entire copy of the content as the content provider for
this torrent. However, most BitTorrent clients support
the superseeding algorithm in which a content provider
announces to have only a partial copy of the content.
Hence, this naive approach cannot be used. In what fol-
lows, we show how we exploit two public sources of
information to aide in identifying the content providers.
2.2.1 Newly Injected Contents
The first source of public information that we exploit to
identify the IP address of the content providers are the
websites that list the content that have just been injected
into BitTorrent. Popular websites such as ThePirateBay
and IsoHunt have a webpage dedicated to the newly in-
jected contents.
A peculiarity of the content provider in a P2P content
distribution network is that he has to be the first one to
subscribe to the tracker in order to distribute a first copy
of the content. The webpage of the newly injected con-
tents may betray that peculiarity because it signals an ad-
versary that a new content has been injected. An adver-
sary can exploit the newly injected contents to contact
the tracker at the very beginning of the content distri-
bution and if he is alone with a peer, conclude that this
peer is the content provider.
To exploit this information, every minute, we down-
load the webpage of newly injected contents from TheP-
irateBay website, determine the contents that have been
added since the last minute, contact the tracker, and
monitor the distribution of each content for 24 hours. If
there is a single peer when we join the torrent, we con-
clude that this peer is the content provider. We repeated
this procedure for 39, 298 contents for a period of 48
days from July 8 to August 24, 2009.
2.2.2 The Logins
Sometimes, a content is distributed first among a private
community of users. Therefore, when the content ap-
pears in the public community there will be more than
one peer subscribed to the tracker within its first minute
of injection on the website. In that case, exploiting
the newly injected contents is useless and an adversary
needs another source of public information to identify
the content provider. The second source that we exploit
are the logins of the content providers on the website.
Indeed, content providers need to log into web sites us-
ing a personal login to announce new contents. Those
logins are public information.
Moreover, a content provider will often be the only
one peer distributing all the contents uploaded by his lo-
gin. The login of a content provider betrays which con-
tents have been injected by that peer because it is possi-
ble to group all the contents uploaded by the same login
on the website. An adversary can exploit the login of
a content provider to see whether a given IP address is
distributing most of the contents injected by that login.
To exploit this information, every minute, we store the
login of the content provider that has uploaded the .tor-
rent file on the webpage of the newly injected contents.
We then group the contents per login and keep those lo-
gins that have uploaded at least 10 new contents. Finally,
we consider the IP address that is distributing the largest
number of contents uploaded by a given login as the con-
tent provider of those contents. We collected the logins
of 6, 210 content providers who have injected 39, 298
contents for a period of 48 days from July 8 to August
24, 2009.
We verified that we did not identify the same IP ad-
dress for many logins which would indicate that we mis-
takenly identify an adversary as content provider. In par-
ticular, on 2, 206 such IP addresses, we identified only
77 as the content provider for more than 1 login, and
only 8 for more than 3 logins. We performed additional
checks that we extensively describe in Le Blond et al.
[2].
We validate the accuracy of those two exploits in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 and present their efficiency to identify the con-
tent providers in Section 3.1.2.
2.3 The Big Downloaders
For now, we define the big downloaders as the IP ad-
dresses that subscribe to the tracker for the largest num-
ber of unique contents. It is believed to be impractical
to identify them because it requires to spy on a con-
siderable number of BitTorrent users. We now describe
the two sources of public information that we exploit to
compromise the privacy of any peer and to identify the
big downloaders.
2.3.1 Scrape-all: Give Me All the Content
Identifiers
Most trackers support scrape-all requests for which they
return the identifiers of all the content they track and for
each content, the number of peers that have downloaded
a full copy of the content, the number of peers currently
subscribed to the tracker with a full copy of the content,
i.e., seeds, and with a partial copy of the content, i.e.,
leechers. A content identifier is a cryptographic hash
derived from .torrent file of a content. Whereas they are
not strictly necessary to the operation of the BitTorrent
protocol, scrape-all requests are used to provide high
level statistics on torrents. By exploiting the scrape-all
requests, an adversary can learn the identifiers of all the
contents for which he can then collect the peers using
the announce requests described in Section 2.3.2.
To exploit this information, every 24 hours, we send
a scrape-all request to all 8 ThePirateBay trackers and
download about 2 million identifiers, which represents
120MB of data per tracker. We then filter out the con-
tents with less than one leecher and one seed which
leaves us with between 500 and 750K contents depend-
ing on the day. We repeated this procedure for 103 days
from May 13 to August 23, 2009. ThePirateBay tracker
is by far the largest tracker with an order of magnitude
more peers and contents than the second biggest tracker
[11], and it runs the OpenTracker software therefore we
limited ourselves to that tracker.
2.3.2 Announce: Give Me Some IP Ad-
dresses
The announce started/stopped requests are sent when a
peer starts/stops distributing a content. Upon receiving
an announce started request, the tracker records the peer
as distributing the content, returns a subset of peers, and
the number of seeds and leechers distributing that con-
tent. When a peer stops distributing a content, he sends
an announce stopped requests and the tracker decre-
ments a counter telling how many contents that peer
is distributing. We have observed that trackers gener-
ally blacklist a peer when he distributes around 100 con-
tents. So an adversary should send an announce stopped
request after each announce started requests not to get
blacklisted. By exploiting announce started/stopped re-
quests for all the identifiers he has collected, an adver-
sary can spy on a considerable number of users.
To exploit this information, every 2 hours, we repeat-
edly send announce started and stopped requests for all
the contents of ThePirateBay trackers so that we collect
the IP address for at least 90% of the peers distributing
each content. We do this by sending announce started
and stopped requests until we have collected a number
of unique IP addresses equal to 90% of the number of
seeds and leechers returned by the tracker. This pro-
cedure takes around 30 minutes for between 500K and
750K contents. By repeating this procedure for 103 days
from May 13 to August 23, 2009, we collected 148 mil-
lion IP addresses downloading 2 billion copies of con-
tents.
We will see in Section 4.1 that once an adversary has
collected the IP-to-content mappings for a considerable
number of BitTorrent users, it is still complex to identify
the big downloaders because it requires to filter out the
false positives due to middleboxes such as NATs, IPv6
gateways, proxies, etc. We will also discuss how an ad-
versary could possibly reduce the number of false neg-
atives by identifying the big downloaders with dynamic
IP addresses. Finally, we will see that an adversary can
also exploit the DHT to collect the IP-to-content map-
pings in Section 6.
2.4 The Torrent Files
Once we have identified the IP address for the content
providers and big downloaders, we use the .torrent files
to profile them. A .torrent file contains the hostname
of the tracker, the content name, its size, the hash of
the pieces, etc. Without .torrent file, a content identifier
is an opaque hash therefore, an adversary must collect
as many .torrent files as possible to profile BitTorrent
users. For instance, an adversary can use the .torrent
files, to determine if the content is likely to be copy-
righted, the volume of unique contents distributed by a
content provider, or the type of content he is distribut-
ing. Clearly, .torrent files must be public for the peers
to distribute contents however, it is surprisingly easy to
collect millions of .torrent files within hours and from a
single machine. By exploiting the .torrent files, an ad-
versary can focus his spying on specific keywords and
profile BitTorrent users.
To exploit this information, we collected all the .tor-
rent files available on Mininova and ThePirateBay web-
sites on May 13, 2009. We discovered 1, 411, 940
unique .torrent files on Mininova and 974, 980 on TheP-
irateBay. The overlap between both website was only
227, 620 files. Then, from May 13, to August 24, 2009,
we collected the new .torrent files uploaded on the Mini-
nova, ThePirateBay, and Isohunt websites. Those three
websites are the most popular and as there is generally a
lot of redundancy among the .torrent files hosted by dif-
ferent websites [11], we limit ourselves to those three.
We will discuss the reasons why our measurement
was previously thought as impractical by the related
work in Section 5.
3 The Content Providers
In this section, we run the exploits from Section 2.2 in
the wild, quantify the content providers that we identify,
and present the results of their profiling.
|Alone| |Login| |Alone ∩Login| Accuracy
21, 544 15, 308 9, 243 99.99%
Table 1: Cross-validation of the two exploits. This table
shows the accuracy of the two exploits to identify the
same content provider for the same content. Alone ∩
Login is the number of contents for which both sources
identified a content provider. Accuracy is the percentage
of such contents for which both sources identified the
same content provider.
3.1 Identifying the Content Providers
We start by validating the exploits we use to identify the
IP address of the content providers.
3.1.1 Validating the Exploits
In Section 2.2, we described two exploits to identify the
IP address of a content provider. The first exploit is to
connect to the tracker as soon as a new content gets in-
jected and to check whether we are alone with the con-
tent provider (Alone). The second exploit is to find the IP
address that has injected the largest number of contents
uploaded by a single login (Login). Whereas it makes
sense to use those exploits to identify content providers,
it is necessary to validate how accurate they are.
We validate the accuracy of these exploits in Table 1.
This table shows that for 9, 243 contents, both exploits
identified a content provider. Moreover, for 99.99% of
those contents both exploits identified the same IP ad-
dress as the content provider. Thus, with a high prob-
ability the same content providers are identified by two
independent exploits.
3.1.2 Quantifying the Identified Content
Providers
In Fig. 1, we identify the IP address for 70% of the con-
tent providers injecting 39, 298 new contents over a pe-
riod of 48 days. The fraction of content providers that
we identify using Alone only decreases with the num-
ber of peers distributing the content. This is because the
more popular the content, the lower the chances to be
alone with the content provider, i.e., from 60% for con-
tents with 10 peers or less to 17% for contents with more
than 1, 000 peers. However, Login compensates for con-
tents with up to 1, 000 peers. In essence, for contents
with more than 1, 000 peers, we identify close to half of
the content providers.
3.2 Profiling the Content Providers
We now use the IP address of the content providers that
we have identified for 48 days to profile their contribu-
tion in number of contents and their location.
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Figure 1: Fraction of content providers that we identify.
On the x-axis, all is for all contents, a-b is for content
with between a and b peers distributing the content after
24 hours, and > 1000 for contents with more than 1, 000
peers distributing the content after 24 hours. Others is
the fraction of content providers that we do not identify.
Figure 2: Tag cloud of contents injected by the content
providers that we have identified. We extract the two
most significant keywords from each content name con-
tained in the .torrent files and vary their police size to re-
flect the number of contents whose name matches those
keywords, the largest the keywords, the more frequent
those keywords appear in the content names.
3.2.1 Semantic of the Injected Contents
Fig. 2 shows a tag cloud of the names of the contents in-
jected into BitTorrent. This tag cloud suggests that many
contents refer to copyrighted material and that BitTor-
rent closely follow events. Indeed, two weeks before we
started to identify the content providers, Michael Jack-
son died and the latest Happy Potter movie got released
one week after.
3.2.2 Contribution of the Content
Providers
We see in Fig. 3 (top) that some content providers inject
much more contents than others with the most active in-
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Figure 3: Distribution of the number of contents injected
by each content provider. The top plot shows the num-
ber of contents per content provider and the bottom plot
shows the CDF of contents.
Rank # contents Volume CC AS name
1 313 136 NZ Vodafone
2 304 79 FR OVH
3 266 152 DE Keyweb
4 246 34 FR OVH
5 219 186 FR OVH
6 212 247 DE Keyweb
7 201 535 FR OVH
8 181 73 US HV
9 181 17 CA Wightman
10 180 7 SK Energotel
11 172 161 FR OVH
12 167 23 RU Corgina
13 145 197 DE Keyweb
14 140 11 FR OVH
15 138 109 US Aaron
16 132 12 US Charter
17 117 119 FR OVH
18 116 109 FR OVH
19 114 79 NL Telfort
20 107 225 RU Matrix
Table 2: Rank, number of contents, volume of contents
(GB), country code, and AS name for the top 20 content
providers.
jecting more than 300 contents in 48 days. The most ac-
tive content providers inject more than 6 contents every
day, e.g., eztv [1], the top content provider, daily injects
6.5 TV shows of 430MB in average. Given the time to
capture and encode a TV show, it suggests that a small
community of users injects contents from the same IP
address.
We now look at the contribution of the biggest content
providers in comparison to the total number of injected
contents. We see in Fig. 3 (bottom), that the top 100
content providers inject 30% of all the contents injected
into BitTorrent and the top 1, 000 content providers in-
ject 60% of all the contents.
Conclusions These results show that few content
providers insert most of the contents. We do not claim
that it is easy to stop those content providers from inject-
ing content into BitTorrent however, it is striking that
such a small number of content providers triggers bil-
lions of downloads. Therefore, it is surprising that the
anti-piracy groups try to stop millions of downloaders
instead of a handful of content providers.
3.2.3 Location of the Content Providers
Focusing on the top 20 content providers in Table 2, we
observe that half of them are using a machine whose
IP address is located in a French and a German hosting
center, i.e., OVH and Keyweb. Those hosting centers
provide cheap offers of dedicated servers with unlimited
traffic and a 100MB/s connection.
However, we observed that the users injecting con-
tents from those servers are unlikely to be be French or
German. Indeed, on 1, 515 contents injected by the con-
tent providers from OVH, only 13 contained the key-
word fr (French) in their name whereas 552 contained
the keyword spanish. Similarly, on 623 contents injected
from Keyweb, we found 228 contents with the keyword
spanish in their name and none contained the keywords
fr, ge (German), or de (Deutsche). In conclusion, one
cannot easily guess the nationality of a content provider
based on the geolocalization of the IP address of the ma-
chine he is using to inject contents.
4 The Big Downloaders
In this section, we focus on the identification and the
profiling of the big downloaders, i.e., the IP addresses
that subscribed in the largest number of contents. Once
we have collected the information described in Sec-
tion 2.3, it is challenging to identify and profile the big
downloaders because of the volume of information. In-
deed, we collected 148M IP addresses and more than
510M endpoints (IP:port) during a period of 103 days.
Ordering the IP addresses according to the total num-
ber of unique contents for which they subscribed, we
observe a long tail distribution. In particular, the top
10, 000 IP addresses subscribed for at least 1, 636 con-
tents and the top 100, 000 IP addresses subscribed for at
least 309 contents. In the remaining of this section, we
focus on the top 10, 000 IP addresses.
In the following, we show that for many IP addresses,
there is a linear relation between their number of con-
tents and their number of ports suggesting that those
IPs are middleboxes with multiple peers behind them.
However, we will also see that some IP addresses sig-
nificantly deviate from this middlebox behavior and we
will identify some of those players with deviant behav-
ior. Finally, we will profile those players.
4.1 The Middlebox Behavior
It is sometimes complex to identify a user based on its
IP address or its endpoint, because the meaning of this
information is different depending on his Internet con-
nectivity. A user can connect through a large variety of
middleboxes such as NATs, IPv6 gateways, proxies, etc.
In all those cases, many users can use the same IP ad-
dress and the same user can use a different IP address
or endpoints. So an adversary using the IP addresses or
endpoints to identify big downloaders may erroneously
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Figure 4: Correlation of the number of ports per IP ad-
dress and of the number of contents for the top 10, 000 IP
addresses. Each dot represents an IP address. The solid
line is the average number of contents on the 148M IP
addresses computed per interval of 2, 000 ports.
identify a middlebox as a big downloader. In the follow-
ing, we aim to filter out those false positives to identify
the big downloaders.
We do not consider false negatives due, for instance,
to a big downloader with a dynamic IP address. It may
be possible to identify big downloaders with a dynamic
IP address but it would require a complex methodology
using the port number as the identifier of a user within
an AS; most BitTorrent clients pick a random port num-
ber when they are first executed and then use that port
number statically. The validation of such a methodology
is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave this im-
provement for future work. However, we will see that
we already find a large variety of big downloaders using
public IP addresses as identifiers.
We confirm the complexity of using an IP address or
endpoint to identify a user in Fig. 4. Indeed, we see
that for most of the IP addresses the number of contents
increases linearly with the number of ports. Moreover,
the slope of this increase corresponds to the slope of the
average number of contents per IP over all 148M IP ad-
dresses (solid line). Each new port corresponds to be-
tween 2 and 3 additional contents per IP address. There-
fore, it is likely that those IP addresses correspond to
middleboxes with a large number of users behind them.
There are also many IP addresses that significantly devi-
ate from this middlebox behavior.
Conclusions A large number of IP addresses that a
naive adversary would classify as big downloaders ac-
tually corresponds to middleboxes such as NATs, IPv6
gateways, or proxies. However, we also observe many
IP addresses whose behavior significantly deviates from
a typical middlebox behavior.
4.2 Identifying the Big Players
To understand the role of the IP addresses that deviate
from middlebox behavior, we identify 6 categories of big
players.
HTTP and SOCKS public proxies The two first cat-
egories are HTTP and SOCKS public proxies that can
be used by BitTorrent users to hide their IP address
from anti-piracy groups. We retrieved a list of IP ad-
dresses of such proxies from the sites hidemyass.com
and proxy.org. We found 81 HTTP proxies and 62
SOCKS proxies within the top 10, 000 IP addresses.
Tor exit nodes The third category is composed of Tor
exit nodes that are the outgoing public interfaces of the
Tor anonymity network. To find, the IP address of the
Tor exit nodes, we performed a reverse DNS lookup for
the top 10, 000 IP addresses and extracted all names con-
taining the tor keyword and manually filtered the results
to make sure they are indeed Tor exit nodes. We also
retrieved a list of nodes on the Web site proxy.org. We
found 174 Tor exit nodes within the top 10, 000 IP ad-
dresses.
Monitors The fourth category is composed of moni-
tors that are peers spying on a large number of contents
without participating in the content distribution. We
identified two ASes, corresponding to hosting centers lo-
cated in the US and UK, containing a large number of IP
addresses within the top 10, 000 with the same behav-
ior. Indeed, these IP addresses always used a single port
and we were never able to download content from them.
Therefore, they look like a dedicated monitoring infras-
tructure instead of regular peers. We found 1, 052 such
IP addresses within only two ASes in the top 10, 000 IP
addresses
VPNs The fifth category is composed of VPNs that
are SOCKS proxies requiring authentication and whose
communication with BitTorrent users is encrypted. To
find VPNs, we performed a reverse DNS lookup for the
top 10, 000 IP addresses and extracted all names con-
taining the itshidden, cyberghostvpn, peer2me, ipredate,
mullvad, and perfect-privacy keywords and manually fil-
tered the results to make sure they are indeed the corre-
sponding VPNs. Those keywords correspond to well-
known VPN services. We found 30 VPNs within the top
10, 000 IP addresses.
Big downloaders The last category is composed of
big downloaders that we redefine as the IP addresses
that distribute the largest number of contents and that
are used by a few users. We selected the IP addresses
we could download content from and that used fewer
than 10 ports. Hence, those IP addresses cannot be a
monitors as we downloaded content from them and they
cannot be large middleboxes due to the small number of
ports. We found 77 such big downloaders.
Conclusions We have identified 6 categories of big
players including the big downloaders. We do not claim
that we have identified all categories of players nor
found all the IP addresses that belong to one of those 6
categories. Instead, we have identified few IP addresses
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Figure 5: Correlation of the number of ports per IP ad-
dress and of the number of contents of the big players.
Each dot represents an IP address. The solid line repre-
sents the middlebox behavior.
in each category within the top 10, 000 peers that we use
in the following to profile the big players.
4.3 Profiling the Big Players
We see in Fig. 5 that for HTTP and SOCKS proxies
the number of contents per IP address is much larger
than for middleboxes (solid line). Considering the huge
number of contents these IP addresses subscribed to, it is
likely that the proxies are used by anti-piracy groups. In-
deed, we see in Fig. 6 that our measurement system sud-
denly stops seeing the IP addresses of monitors after day
50. In fact, by that date, ThePirateBay tracker changed
its blacklisting strategy to reject IP addresses that are
subscribed to a large number of contents. Whereas it
was not a problem for our measurement system because
it uses announce stopped requests as described in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, monitors got blacklisted. However, we ob-
serve on day 80 that the number of HTTP and SOCKS
proxies suddenly increased, probably corresponding to
anti-piracy groups migrating their monitoring infrastruc-
ture from dedicated hosting centers to proxies. Consid-
ering, the synchronization we observe in Fig. 6 in the
activity of the HTTP and SOCKS proxies, it is likely
that those proxies were used in a coordinated effort.
The correlation for monitors and big downloaders in
Fig. 5 does not show any striking result, therefore we
do not discuss it further. However, we observe in Fig. 5
that for Tor exit nodes and VPNs the number of contents
per IP address is close to the IP addresses of the middle-
boxes (solid line). For large number of ports, Tor exit
nodes deviate from the standard middlebox behavior. In
fact, we found that just a few IP addresses are responsi-
ble of this deviation, all other Tor exit nodes following
the trend of the solid line. We believe that those few IP
addresses responsible for the deviation are used by either
big downloaders or anti-piracy groups.
Conclusions We have shown that many peers do not
correspond to a BitTorrent user but to monitors or to
middleboxes with multiple users behind them. These
peers introduce a lot of noise for an adversary who
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Figure 6: Activity of the big players in time. For each
category, the dashed line represents the fraction of the
top 10, 000 IP addresses of a given snapshot that be-
longs to the top 10, 000 IP addresses on all snapshots.
The solid line represents, for each category, the fraction
of the top 10, 000 IP addresses on all previous snapshots
that belongs to the top 10, 000 IP addresses on all snap-
shots.
would like to spy on BitTorrent users and in particular
on the big downloaders. However, we have shown that
it is possible to filter out that noise to identify the IP ad-
dress and profile the big downloaders.
5 Related Work
As far as we know, no related work has explored the
identification of the content providers in BitTorrent so
both the data and the results concerning these players
are entirely new.
Some related work has measured BitTorrent at a mod-
erate scale but none at a large-enough scale to identify
the big downloaders. This is because most of the mea-
surements inherited two problems from using existing
BitTorrent clients [7, 8, 10]. The first problem is that
existing clients introduce a huge computational over-
head on the measurement. For instance, each announce
started request takes one fork and one exec. Therefore,
the measurement is hard to efficiently parallelize.
The second problem is that regular BitTorrent clients
do not exploit all the public sources of information that
we have presented in Section 2.3 and 2.4. A content
identifier is essentially the hash of a .torrent file. So not
exploiting scrape-all requests limits the number of spied
contents to the number of .torrent files an adversary has
collected. In addition, clients may not be stopped prop-
erly and so not send the announce stopped request, mak-
ing the measurement prone to blacklisting.
In the following, we describe how the scale of pre-
vious measurements differs from ours according to the
sources of public information that they exploit.
5.1 No Exploitation of Scrape-all Requests
We split the related work not exploiting scrape-all re-
quests into two families: A first family spying on few
contents and a second one using a large infrastructure to
spy on more contents. Siganos et al. measured the top
600 contents from The ThePirateBay [10] Web site dur-
ing 45 days collecting 37 million IP addresses. Using
only the top 600 contents does not allow an adversary
to identify the big downloaders. The same remark holds
for Choffnes et al. [4] who monitored 10, 000 peers and
did not record information identifying contents therefore
they cannot either identify the big downloaders.
The second family spied on more contents but using a
large infrastructure. Piatek et al. used a cluster of work-
stations to collect 12 million IP addresses distributing
55, 523 contents in total [7, 8]. It is unclear how many
simultaneous contents they spied as they reported being
blacklisted when being too aggressive, suggesting that
they did not properly send announce stopped requests.
Finally, Zhang et al. [11] is the work that is the closest
to ours in scale however, they used an infrastructure of
35 machines to collect 5 million IP addresses within a 12
hours window. In comparison, our customized measure-
ment system used 1 machine to collect around 7 million
IP addresses within the same time window, making it
about 50 times more efficient. In addition, that we per-
formed our measurement from a single machine demon-
strates that virtually anyone can spy on BitTorrent users,
which is a serious privacy issue.
5.2 No Exploitation of Announce Requests
Dan et al. measured 2.4 million torrents with 37 mil-
lion peers, but used a different terminology [5]. Indeed,
they performed only scrape-all requests so they knew the
number of peers per torrent but not the IP addresses of
those peers. This data is much easier to get and com-
pletely different in focus.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We have shown that enough information is available
publicly in BitTorrent for an adversary to spy on most
BitTorrent users of the Internet from a single machine.
At any moment in time for 103 days, we were spying
on the distribution of between 500 and 750K contents.
In total, we collected 148M of IP addresses distributing
1.2M contents, which represents 2 billion copies of con-
tent.
Leveraging on this measurement, we were able to
identify the IP address of the content providers for 70%
of the new contents injected into BitTorrent and to pro-
file them. In particular, we have shown that a few con-
tent providers inject most of the contents into BitTorrent
making us wonder why anti-piracy groups targeted ran-
dom users instead. We also showed that an adversary
can compromise the privacy of any peer in BitTorrent
and identify the IP address of the big downloaders. We
have seen that it was complex to filter out false positives
of big downloaders such as monitors and middleboxes
and proposed a methodology to do so.
We argue that this privacy threat is a fundamental
problem of open P2P infrastructures. Even though we
did not present it in this paper, we have also exploited
the DHT to collect IP-to-content mappings using a sim-
ilar methodology as for the trackers. That we were also
able to collect the IP-to-content mappings on a com-
pletely different infrastructure reinforces our claim that
the problem of privacy is inherent to open P2P infras-
tructures.
A solution to protect the privacy of BitTorrent users
might be to use proxies or anonymity networks such as
Tor, however a recent work shows that it is even possible
to collect the IP-to-content mappings of BitTorrent users
on Tor [3]. Therefore, the degree to which it is possible
to protect the IP-to-content mappings of P2P filesharing
users remains an open question.
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